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Abstract
Purpose - This paper investigates whether the choice for a Big4-affiliated local audit firm affects the 
capital structure of listed companies in Indonesia, a fast-growing emerging country that is characterized 
by high information asymmetry and low litigation risk. A unique characteristic of the Indonesian audit 
environment is that Big4 auditors can only enter the market indirectly through affiliation with a local 
audit firm. 
Design/methodology/approach – A sample of Indonesian listed companies between 2008 and 2015 is 
used to investigate this relation using OLS. To address the concern that the choice for Big4-affiliated 
auditors might reflect client characteristics, we also perform OLS on a matched sample, using both 
propensity-score and entropy-balance matching. 
Findings – Across all three samples, we document that companies audited by a Big4-affiliated local 
audit firm display lower debt ratios. We find no such effect for affiliation with second-tier audit firms. 
Surprisingly, we find that the negative effect of Big4 affiliation is increasing in client size. 
Research limitations/implications - This study provides evidence of the consequences of hiring Big4 
auditors on the perceived information asymmetry by financial markets under extreme conditions: in an 
environment characterized by low litigation risk and where Big4 auditors can operate only indirectly 
through affiliation. 
Practical implications – The results of this study are of interest to policy makers, managers and 
financial stakeholders in emerging countries where external financing is important yet difficult to obtain 
because of severe information asymmetry. Hiring a Big4 auditor – even only through affiliation, might 
reduce perceived information asymmetry and increase the access to external equity financing. 
Originality/Value - To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to provide evidence of the 
effect of Big4 auditors on their clients’ capital structure when they can operate only indirectly through 
affiliation with a local auditor. 
Keywords emerging markets, capital structure, Big4 audit firm
Paper type Research Paper

































































This paper investigates whether the choice for a Big4-affiliated local audit firm affects the 
capital structure of listed companies in Indonesia. The pecking order theory argues that because of 
information asymmetry, companies will be financed using internal financing first, and when external 
financing is needed, debt financing will be preferred over equity financing (Petacchi, 2015; Bharath et 
al., 2009; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Previous literature has shown that one of the mechanisms to reduce 
information asymmetry is the appointment of high quality, most often Big4, audit firms, as these firms 
are expected to increase the credibility of the financial statements (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1983; Becker et al., 1998; Choi and Wong, 2007; Fan and Wong, 2005). Therefore, 
one could expect that auditor choice affects the relative attractiveness of debt as a financing means and 
influences the debt-equity mix (Chang et al., 2009). The basic intuition is the following: Given that debt 
offers more protection than equity to the providers of finance, debt is – compared to equity – less 
sensitive to problems of information asymmetry. Accordingly, one might expect that hiring a Big4 
auditor lowers, through its effect on the perceived information asymmetry, the optimal debt ratio. 
A previous study has already provided evidence consistent with this idea (Chang et al., 2009). 
However, this study was conducted in the U.S. While some of the capital structure theories tested in 
developed markets are transferable to emerging countries, specific institutional features which 
characterize emerging countries might call for country-specific evidence (Booth et al., 2001). For 
instance, one argument to expect higher quality from Big4 auditors relies on the higher risks and costs 
of litigation facing Big4 audit firms (Dye, 1993; Deangelo, 1981). The question whether this theory 
also holds in an environment of low litigation, which characterizes most emerging countries, is an 
empirical matter. To the best of our knowledge, except for Detthamrong et al. (2017), there exist no 
studies that have empirically investigated the relation between auditor choice and capital structure in an 
emerging country. 
From a pragmatic point of view, the issue of information asymmetry, its effect on the finance 
structure and the role of auditors therein is especially pertinent for emerging countries as especially 
these countries suffer a reputation of low transparency and inferior disclosure quality (Fan and Wong, 
2002; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013) coupled with weak investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003). 
Moreover, unlike most companies from developed countries which have diffuse ownership, companies 
in emerging countries are characterized by highly concentrated family ownership (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013; Claessens et al., 2000) and involvement of family members in the top management 
(Fan et al., 2011; Prabowo and Simpson, 2011). Given that companies in emerging countries are 
relatively more dependent on external funds to boost their economic growth (Atkins & Glen, 1992), the 
relatively high information asymmetry is a restriction with potentially material negative consequences 
for the development of companies and the country as a whole. 
































































Indonesia is a setting which is especially interesting to investigate this question as foreign (Big4 
or other) auditors are only allowed to operate in Indonesia indirectly through affiliation with a local 
auditor. Hence, documentation of a negative relation between Big4 involvement and leverage in such a 
setting would provide relatively strong evidence of the effect of Big4 auditors on perceived information 
asymmetry.
We test our hypothesis on a sample of Indonesian listed firms between 2008 and 2015. We 
regress the debt ratio on a dummy variable indicating whether or not the audit is performed by a Big4-
affiliated local audit firm and a set of control variables. We are conscious about  potential endogeneity 
concerns arising from self-selection. Prior research has argued not only that the auditor choice by 
companies is non-random and related to company-characteristics but also that audit firms themselves 
decide whether they will accept or reject clients (Eshleman and Guo, 2014). Big4 audit firms might 
avoid low-quality or high-risk clients (DeFond et al., 2017; Johnstone, 2000; Johnstone and Bedard, 
2004) to minimize litigation risk. Accordingly, potential clients with significant risk of financial distress 
as a result of high leverage might be avoided by Big4 audit firms. The endogenous nature of auditor 
choice may render standard linear regression on an unmatched sample inappropriate resulting in biased 
coefficient estimates. To address this concern, we also perform OLS on a propensity-score matched 
sample and on an entropy-balance matched sample. Across these three sample compositions, we find 
evidence of a negative relation between affiliation with a Big4 auditor and leverage. 
Next, we also were interested to investigate whether affiliation with a second-tier auditor would 
produce a similar effect. The growth of second-tier firms and the emergence of ‘second-tier’ as a brand 
name suggests that second-tier audit firms also face reputation and litigation concerns, which would 
reduce the differences in their incentive system compared with that of the Big4 audit firms. To 
investigate this, we re-code our dummy variable so that it now indicates both affiliation with either Big4 
or second-tier audit firm. For all sample compositions (unmatched, PSM and entropy-balance), we find 
that, although still negative, the effect on leverage is smaller when second-tier firms and Big4 firms are 
considered as one class. Subsequently, we delete all firm-year observations with Big4 affiliations. In 
the remaining sample, we create a new dummy variable indicating affiliation with a second-tier audit 
firm. Across the three sampling methods (unmatched, PSM and entropy-balanced) we find that the 
effect of affiliation with second-tier auditors is, with a few exceptions, not significant.
Finally, we wanted to investigate whether the effect of Big4 affiliation would differ according 
to the size of the client. Information asymmetry is expected to be higher for small companies (Bhushan, 
1989; Collins, Kothari & Rayburn, 1987) as these firms experience less extensive analyst following 
(Barth, Kasznik & McNichols, 2001) and media coverage (Fang & Peress, 2009). Hence, we expect 
there to be less opportunity for Big4 auditors to further mitigate information asymmetry for large 
companies. We include an interaction effect between Big4 affiliation and size to investigate this 
































































hypothesis. Surprisingly, we find that the negative effect of Big4 affiliation increases with size. A 
possible explanation is that increased analyst activity and media attention which surrounds large 
companies also makes the perceived higher financial reporting quality from Big4 affiliation more salient 
in the financial markets.   
This study contributes to the empirical literature on the link between information asymmetry 
and companies’ capital structure in various ways. First, it contributes by investigating the effect of the 
appointment of a Big4 audit firm on capital structure in an emerging country where litigation risk is 
low. As such it complements prior evidence from the U.S. setting where there is a substantial risk of 
litigation (Chang et al.  2009) and indicates that litigation risk is not a necessary condition for a reduction 
in perceived information asymmetry by appointing a Big4 auditor. Second, the study examines this 
impact in an emerging country where Big4 firms can only enter the market through affiliation with a 
local audit firm. Evidence on the effects of Big4 adoption in such environments is scarce. A notable 
exception is Houque et al. (2017) who examine the impact of the affiliation of local Indian audit firms 
with one of the Big4 on the cost of equity capital of the clients. We add to this study by examining the 
impact of Big4 affiliation on client debt ratios. By providing evidence that hiring a high-quality auditor 
is negatively associated with financial leverage in Indonesia we also contribute to an emerging literature 
on the impact of Big4 audits on the financing of firms in non-US markets in general (Houque et al. 
2017, Okere et al. 2018, Detthamrong et al. 2017).
For emerging countries, where external capital is important but obtaining finance is often 
hindered by severe information asymmetry, our result that the choice of a reputable audit firm is 
associated with a lower debt ratio might be of interest to policy makers, as well as managers and 
financial stakeholders. Concretely, for policy makers the results imply that taking action to ease the 
entrance of Big4 firms in the Indonesian audit market can support firms’ access to external funds and 
as such economic growth. An implication for managers is to seriously consider incurring the cost of 
appointing of a Big4-affilated auditor as this leads to benefits in the form of enhanced access to external 
funds to finance their growth.
 Indonesia provides a pertinent context for research on the role of Big4 audit firms in the access 
to external finance. First of all, Indonesia is one of the emerging countries with the highest economic 
growth. For instance, during the period 2004 to 2014, the annual growth rate of real GDP was about 
5.9% (Oliver Wyman and Mandiri Institute, 2015). To maintain this growth, the Indonesian companies 
rely heavily on external financing, hence the access to external financing instruments is a matter of 
material importance. Secondly, similar to other emerging countries, in Indonesia, severe information 
asymmetries often hamper the access to finance. The major causes of information asymmetry in 
Indonesia – and also other East Asian countries – are highly concentrated ownership (Claessens et al., 
2000; Fan and Wong, 2002) and involvement of family members in top management (Prabowo and 
































































Simpson, 2011). Tabalujan (2002) shows for Indonesian companies, that family members often occupy 
key management functions or sit on the board of directors leading to even more severe information 
asymmetry between a company and its external financial stakeholders (Fan and Wong, 2002). In 
addition, Indonesia suffers a reputation of low transparency and disclosure quality (Fan and Wong, 
2002; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013) and of weak investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003). In such an 
environment the potential impact of auditor choice on financing access and hence economic growth 
might be economically very important and worthwhile of study. Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, 
Indonesia is one of the few countries where foreign (Big4, second-tier or other) auditors are only 
allowed to offer their services indirectly by affiliation with a local audit firm. The fact that the local 
auditor still has to be involved and the international auditor can only have an indirect effect – through 
its cooperation with the local auditor – makes any findings that Big4 auditors have an effect on the 
leverage ratio, stronger than in countries where Big4 auditors can operate directly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the Indonesian 
background including its accounting and audit environment. Then, we provide a literature review and 
develop our hypothesis.  Next, we describe our research design and data collection procedure. 




Indonesia is the largest economy in South-east Asia, represents almost 40 percent of the 
region’s economic output. It is the world’s fourth most populous nation, the world’s 10th largest 
economy in terms of purchasing power parity and a member of the G-20 (The World Bank, 2019).
Nonetheless, the Indonesian capital markets are relatively under-developed (Oliver Wyman and 
Mandiri Institute, 2015). In 2014, the market capitalization of listed domestic companies in percentage 
of GDP was 47% (The World Bank, 2016) and the number of listed companies is 506 (Indonesia Stock 
Exchange, 2016). The public debt market in Indonesia is dominated by government bonds, corporate 
bonds representing only 30% of the funds raised (IDX and IBPA, 2014). Bond market liquidity is 
generally quite low (Oliver Wyman and Mandiri Institute, 2015). The number of companies with listed 
corporate bonds in 2014 is 102 (Indonesia Stock Exchange, 2016). Debt financing, through bank loans, 
is an important financial source (Oliver Wyman and Mandiri Institute, 2015). In 2014, bank loan 
funding amounted to about 58% of total corporate funding in Indonesia (Oliver Wyman and Mandiri 
Institute, 2015). For our sample of listed firms, the average total debt ratio is about 32% using the market 
value of equity and 37% using the book value of equity while the average long-term debt ratio is 23% 
and 25.5% respectively. 
































































The Indonesian accounting and audit environment
The Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 2007 requires corporate entities to prepare 
financial statements in accordance with the Indonesian financial accounting standards (SAKSs) issued 
by the Indonesian Financial Accounting Standard Board (DSAK) of the Institute of Indonesian 
Chartered Accountants (IAI) (IFAC, 2016). The IAI is responsible for the regulation of the professional 
accountants, including setting accounting standards in the private sector, administering the Chartered 
Accountant Indonesia exam, providing continuing professional education, establishing a code of ethics, 
adopting professional standards and maintaining a disciplinary system for its members. In 2012, as part 
of the ongoing convergence process, the DSAK aligned SAKs with the IASs and IFRSs as they existed 
in 2009. By January 1, 2015, at the end of a second phase of the convergence process, SAKs were 
substantially aligned with IASs and IFRSs as they existed in 2014.
The financial reports of publicly listed companies should be audited. The Indonesian Institute 
of Public Accountants or IAPI is legally empowered to set auditing standards (SPAPs) for the public 
accountancy profession. In 2012, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) (2010) were adopted. 
These standards are effective for listed companies for audits of financial statements for periods 
beginnings on or after January, 2013 (IFAC, 2016). 
Foreign audit firms can only enter the Indonesian audit market through partnering with a local 
audit firm. According to Indonesian regulation, an international audit firm partnering with a local firm 
should provide training programs, impose standards on quality control and perform periodic quality 
controls. Kartikahadi (2010) describes that the Big4 audit firms use tight selection and evaluation 
procedures in choosing their local partners. The evaluation of a local business partner covers factors 
such as the firm’s compliance with professional standards, its business plan, the completeness of the 
professional services offered, the quantity and quality of the professional staff and the organization 
structure and the available infrastructure. The affiliating international auditor is required to organize 
consulting workshops, annual meetings and quality reviews for its local partners. 
There are several indicators suggesting that there are serious quality issues within the local 
Indonesian accounting and audit context (Dunakhir, 2016). With few exceptions, most accounting firms 
in Indonesia are relatively small. Many firms are audited by capacity-constrained accounting firms (The 
World Bank, 2010a). The local accounting firms, due to lack of adequate resources, face challenges in 
providing high-quality auditing services for entities with complex business transactions. Anecdotal 
evidence from interviews with practicing auditors revealed high levels of compliance gaps with respect 
to audit planning, documentation, related party investigation and fraud detection 
Furthermore, in many emerging markets, regulations are not fully enforced (Ball, 2001; Chan 
and Hameed, 2006). This is also the case in the Indonesian audit environment. Cases where companies, 
shareholders or third parties sue public accounting firms are very rare. This is assumed to be the result 
































































of costly and time consuming court processes, lack of experienced judges and laws and regulations that 
are perceived to be ambiguous (The World Bank, 2010b). Brown et al. (2014) classified countries based 
on the quality of the auditors’ working environment and the degree of accounting enforcement and 
ranked Indonesia as 46th of 51 countries, indicating low quality.
Prior literature review and hypothesis development
Central in the pecking order theory is that information asymmetry drives a hierarchical 
financing strategy: a company will prefer internal financing, and when external financing is needed, 
debt financing is preferred over equity financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Debt is less information-
sensitive because by issuing debt, companies offer pre-commitment that serves as a protective 
mechanism for the holders such as interest and principal payments, debt covenants and the possibility 
to force liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982). Equity would be the finance source of last resort as it 
is the most sensitive to information asymmetry. Consequently, firms characterized by higher 
information asymmetry would have relatively more debt over equity financing, i.e. display higher 
leverage ratios. There exists empirical evidence from developed markets, mainly from the US, 
consistent with this idea (Bharath et al., 2009; Petacchi, 2015).
One particular mechanism to reduce information asymmetry is the appointment of a high 
quality external auditor. Previous research has argued (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and documented 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983) that an external audit can enhance the credibility of financial statements 
thereby mitigating information asymmetry problems. It is further argued that Big4 audit firms provide 
external audit services of higher quality (Becker et al., 1998; Choi and Wong, 2007; Fan and Wong, 
2005) in order to maintain their valuable reputation (Deangelo, 1981) and/or in order to avoid expensive 
litigation resulting from them having “deeper pockets” (Dye, 1993). Companies hiring Big4 audit firms 
would therefore be relatively more inclined to finance with equity over debt, and would thus display 
lower leverage ratios. Chang et al. (2009) provided evidence of a negative relationship between audit 
quality and the debt ratio for the US setting. 
Previous research has shown that in emerging countries external financing is relatively more 
important than internal financing (Atkins and Glen, 1992), yet exactly for these countries, much less is 
known about the effect of information asymmetry on firms’ capital structure than for developed 
countries. Moreover, Booth et al. (2001) find that, although some of the insights in capital structure 
theory in developed countries can be applied in emerging countries, there are differences across 
countries which require country-specific testing of theories. Therefore, we find it worthwhile to 
empirically test the following hypothesis in the context of an emerging country like Indonesia:
H: Companies audited by Big4 audit firms display lower leverage ratios than those audited by non-
Big4 audit firms

































































To test our hypothesis, we regress companies’ leverage on a dummy indicating whether a 
company’s local auditor was affiliated with a Big4 auditor or not together with a set of control variables. 
Our basic regression looks as follows: 
DRj,𝑡 + 1 =  β0 + β1 ∗ BIG4j,t +  β2 ∗ SIZEj,t +  β3 ∗ ROAj,t +  β4 ∗ INDLEVj,t + β5 ∗ MTBj,t
+  β6 ∗ RETj,t + β7 ∗ PPEj,t + β8 ∗ DEBTAXj,t +  β9 ∗ NDEBTAXj,t +  β10
∗ SDROAj,t +  εj,t            
The dependent variable is the debt ratio DR. Prior studies suggest different operational 
measures. According to Rajan and Zingales (1995), the effects of past financing decisions are best 
represented by the ratio of total long term debt to capital, which includes total long term debt in the 
numerator. A number of capital structure studies in developing countries (Booth et al., 2001; Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999) however has shown that short term debt in developing countries is 
relatively more significant compared to developed countries. Accordingly, we use a second debt ratio, 
i.e. the total debt to capital ratio, which  includes both short- and long-term debt in the numerator. To 
examine the robustness of the results, each debt ratio is calculated using as denominator either the sum 
of the book values of debt and equity or the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of 
debt. Hence, we calculate four different debt ratio measures. LTDMEQ is the long term debt ratio using 
the market value of equity capital and the book value of debt in the denominator, while LTDEQ is 
defined as the long term debt ratio using the book value of equity and debt capital in the denominator.  
The total debt ratios, TDMEQ and TDEQ, are defined accordingly. As in prior literature (e.g. Gao & 
Zhu, 2015) we use one-year-ahead debt ratio measures for the dependent variable.
Our variable of interest is BIG4, a dummy variable indicating whether the local auditor was 
affiliated with a Big4 firm or not. The control variables are consistent with prior empirical literature 
investigating the debt ratio (Chen et al., 2016; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth 
et al., 2001). Regarding SIZE, here measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, the trade-off theory 
predicts that large firms are generally more diversified and have a better reputation, leading to a lower 
risk of default. Therefore, larger firms tend to have higher leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Fama and 
French, 2002). The next variable, ROA, defined as net income before extraordinary items scaled over 
assets, is a measure of profitability. According to the pecking order theory firms prefer internal over 
external financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). An alternative theory, the dynamic trade-off theory, states 
that firms accumulate profits passively (Fischer et al., 1989). Both theories predict a negative relation 
between profitability and leverage. INDLEV is the industry median of the dependent variable. 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) empirically showed that firms adjust their debt ratio toward the industry 
































































average. MTB or the market-to-book ratio proxies for growth and investment opportunities. Following 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995), it is calculated as the sum of the book value of debt and the market value 
of equity, scaled by the book value of total assets. The relation between growth opportunities and 
leverage is ambiguous (Frank and Goyal, 2009). The trade-off theory predicts that growth reduces 
leverage since firms with more growth opportunities will rely more on shareholders’ investment (Frank 
and Goyal, 2009). In contrast, the pecking order theory implies a positive relationship between growth 
and leverage. Higher growth firms need more funds to finance their investments and therefore tend to 
accumulate more debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Following Frank and Goyal (2009), we also include 
the stock market return over the last year (RET). The market timing theory predicts a negative relation 
since higher market returns indicate preferable circumstances to issue equity. PPE is measured as 
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Frank and Goyal (2009) suggest a positive relation 
between the proportion of tangible assets and leverage since this type of assets is easier to value by 
outsiders which lowers expected distress costs. Furthermore, the tangible assets can serve as collateral 
(Chen et al., 2016). The variable DEBTAX is calculated as current income tax divided by pre-tax 
income and is a proxy for the marginal tax rate. Firms have more incentives to increase debt if the 
marginal tax rate is higher because of the higher tax deductibility of interest expense (Chen et al., 2016; 
Frank and Goyal, 2009). NDEBTAX is calculated by depreciation expense divided by total assets and 
is a proxy for non-debt tax shields, which are a substitute for tax deductibles from debt (Deangelo and 
Masulis, 1980). Firms with high depreciation have less interest in other tax deductibles like interest 
payments from debt, so a negative relation between NDEBTAX and the debt ratio is expected 
(Deangelo and Masulis, 1980). However, Bradley et al. (1984) argue that there is a positive association 
between depreciation expense and leverage since high depreciation means high tangible assets that 
allow the companies to borrow at lower interest rates if the tangible assets are used to secure the debt. 
Therefore, there is an ambiguous relationship between NDEBTAX and the debt ratio. Finally, the 
variable SDROA is defined as the standard deviation of ROA over the previous three years and is a 
proxy for business risk. It is expected to have a negative relation with leverage (Booth et al., 2001).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
When estimating our basic regression with ordinary least squares (OLS), potential endogeneity 
concerns arise because it can be argued that auditor choice by the company is not random but related to 
certain company characteristics which are also related to the debt ratio. Furthermore, the audit firms 
themselves decide whether or not they will accept or reject clients (Eshleman and Guo, 2014). Big4 
firms may avoid low-quality and risky clients (DeFond et al., 2017) to minimize litigation risk 
(Johnstone and Bedard, 2004; Johnstone, 2000). According to this reasoning, clients with high risk of 
financial distress due to a high level of indebtedness may find it more difficult to attract a Big4 auditor. 
































































Accordingly, applying OLS to an unbalanced sample of Big4 and non-Big4 clients might result in a 
biased estimate of the treatment effect of BIG4, whereby the estimated coefficient also reflects client 
characteristics. To address this concern, we try two alternatives. First, we compose a propensity-score 
matched control sample. The technique of propensity score matching (PSM) pairs observations based 
on the probability of undergoing a treatment, which in our case is the probability of using a Big4 auditor. 
The matching models generate samples in which the clients of Big4 and non-Big4 auditors are similar, 
providing a setting which allows to estimate the effects of Big4 auditor choice free from bias from 
related client characteristics (Shipman, Swanquist and Whited, 2016; Wilde, 2017). Armstrong et al. 
(2010) argue that propensity score matching on both the determinants of the treatment (i.e. Big4 
affiliation) and the determinants of the outcome (i.e.  the debt ratio) relaxes the assumption of a constant 
functional relationship between the control variables and the outcome of interest. Accordingly, we 
include both determinants of the debt ratio and of Big4 in the matching model used to select control 
firms. Our explanatory variables for Big4 are based on prior literature (Chaney et al., 2004; Choi and 
Wong, 2007; Fan and Wong, 2005; Guedhami et al., 2014, Suryanto et al. 2017). First, to take into 
account the effect of foreign ownership, we create a dummy variable FOREIGN, taking the value of 1 
if the largest shareholder is from a foreign country and zero otherwise. Investors from foreign countries 
tend to demand higher quality financial reporting (He et al., 2014). Firms are expected to respond to 
this demand by appointing a Big4 audit firm. The variables OWN, CROSS, and STATE are intended 
to capture the influence of agency conflicts on audit demand. OWN stands for concentrated ownership 
and is calculated as the percentage of closely held shares as defined in Worldscope. More in particular 
this is the percentage of shares held by cross-holdings, corporations, holdings, governments, employees 
and individual insiders. Highly concentrated ownership creates agency conflicts between controlling 
and minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2005). Big4 audit firms can serve as a signal to mitigate 
agency conflicts (Choi and Wong, 2007). Fan and Wong (2005) document that firms with highly 
concentrated ownership are more likely to choose a Big4 audit firm. Therefore, we expect a positive 
coefficient on this variable. CROSS is a dummy variable indicating that a company is cross-listed 
abroad. Previous literature (Fan and Wong, 2005; Guedhami et al., 2014) suggests that cross-listing 
may affect a company’s choice for a Big4 audit firm. Again, we expect a positive sign on this 
coefficient. STATE is a dummy variable indicating that a company is state-owned. Chen et al. (2011) 
argue that state-owned companies are less likely to choose high quality auditors since there is less 
demand for high-quality financial reporting in those companies. Accordingly, we expect a negative sign 
for this coefficient. 
We further include SIZE, ATURN and CURR. SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets while ATURN is calculated as the proportion of total sales to total assets. SIZE and ATURN 
proxy for the size and the level of economic activity of the company respectively and are expected to 
indicate the level of auditors’ effort to achieve a sufficient level of assurance (Simunic and Stein, 1996; 
































































Francis et al., 1999; Choi and Wong, 2007; Piot, 2001). Following Chaney et al. (2004), we also include 
the ratio of current asset to total assets (CURR) in the regression due to the complexities of inventories 
and receivables which may require specific audit procedures. We expect a positive coefficient on all 
three variables.  
To control for financial risk, we use LEV, LOSS and ROA. LEV is measured as long-term debt 
scaled by total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of negative net income 
before extraordinary items in the previous year. ROA, return on assets of the year, is calculated as net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. LEV and LOSS are associated with the 
probability of a client’s financial distress which is related to audit risk (Choi and Wong, 2007). Hence, 
a negative relation is expected. However, LEV also captures potential agency conflicts. Chaney et al. 
(2004) argue that highly leveraged firms may prefer to hire high quality auditors to reduce agency costs. 
Therefore, the direction of LEV is unclear. The variable ROA captures profitability. Previous studies 
(Chaney et al., 2004; Guedhami and Pittman, 2011; Fan et al., 2011) suggest that auditor choice might 
be influenced by a firm’s profitability. We expect a positive coefficient of ROA since more profitable 
firms tend to have less audit risk. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of PSM, this matching technique is not without its disadvantages 
(Lawrence, Minutti-Mezza and Zhang, 2011). First of all, PSM eliminates observations that lack 
counterfactuals. The loss of a substantial portion of the sample may limit the ability to make valid 
generalizations. Secondly, PSM requires several design choices like caliper distance and whether to 
match with or without replacement. Alternative choices are often equally defensible and may impact 
sample composition and hence the estimation of the treatment effect. 
Given these weaknesses, we also perform OLS on an entropy-balanced sample. Entropy 
balancing is a relatively new matching technique that weighs control sample units to achieve covariate 
balance between Big4 and non-Big4 groups along the first, second and third moments of the control 
variable distributions without requiring design choices that can affect the composition of the control 
sample (Wilde, 2017). To achieve this balance, rather than PSM, which eliminates observations without 
counterfactuals, i.e. gives these a weight of zero, entropy balancing weighs observations smoothly. This 
way, entropy-balancing allows the researcher to use the complete sample for regression analysis.  
Data Collection and Sampling Procedure
All financial data were retrieved from Worldscope. Since Worldscope only provides data on 
the auditor of the latest available year, we hand-collected the data on the auditors over the years of the 
study from the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and the companies’ audit reports. The 
audit reports, included in the companies’ financial statements that were retrieved from the website from 
Indonesian Stock Exchange, state both the name of the local auditor and the international partner (if 
































































any). By regulation, foreign audit firms can only enter the Indonesian audit market through cooperation 
with a local audit firm. Additionally, one foreign audit firm can only cooperate with one local audit 
firm. We identify local audit firms that affiliate with Big4 namely (1) Purwantono, Suherman & Surja 
that affiliate with Ernst & Young; (2) Siddharta, Widjaja & partner with KPMG; (3) Satrio, Bing, Eny 
& partners with Deloitte and (4) Tanudiredja, Wibisana, Rintis that partner with PwC. Following Hogan 
and Martin (2009) in defining second-tier audit firms we identify Grant Thornton, Crowe, and BDO 
Seidman as international second-tier audit firms in our sample. The local audit firms that affiliates with 
those are (1) Gani, Sigiro & Handayani; (2) Kosasih, Nurdiyaman, Mulyadi, Tjahjo & partners and 
Tanubrata, Sutanto, Fahmi, Bambang & partners. Other local audit firms that affiliate with non-Big4 
and non-second-tier and those that are not affiliated with foreign audit firms are classified as “others”. 
Ownership data were hand-collected from the ICMD and company financial statements.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 summarizes our sample selection procedure. We began with the set of non-financial 
Indonesian listed companies that existed between 2008 and 2015. Initially, our sample contained 2,573 
company-year observations. From the initial sample, we excluded companies that experienced an asset 
growth rate of more than 100 percent in any year (64 company-years), as the latter is an indication of 
significant restructuring activities (Duchin et al., 2010). Further, to guarantee independent observations, 
we excluded subsidiary companies when the parent company was also included in our sample (138 
company-years). Finally, we dropped 394 company-years for which there were missing values. Our 
final sample consisted of 1,977 company-years. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the sample by year 
and industry. Comparing our sample with the initial sample, there appear to be no major problems with 
respect to over- or underrepresentation of certain years or sectors.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics. We winsorized all continuous variables at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. From panel A, we can see that the averages of LTDMEQ and LTDEQ are 23.3% and 
25.5% respectively, the means of TDMEQ and TDEQ being 32.1% and 36.9%. 
































































The percentage of audits performed by local audit firms affiliated with Big4 audit firms is 
38.6%. It is worth noting that the number of companies using Big4-affiliated audit firms in Indonesia 
is relatively low compared to other countries. Francis et al. (2013), for example, report that the 
percentages of firms audited by Big4 audit firms for the US, Australia, the UK, Singapore and Malaysia 
are 61%, 71%, 50%, 72% and 53% respectively.
Table 4 panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the variables following a partition of our 
sample based on audit firm type. The companies audited by Big4-affiliated local audit firms tend to 
have lower long term and total debt ratio’s computed using the market value approach, tend to be larger, 
more profitable, have higher growth opportunities, have a higher proportion of tangible assets to total 
assets, have more tax shields and lower business risk as measured by the volatility of earnings. 
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The Pearson and Spearman correlations are presented in Table 5. BIG4 is negatively related to 
the long term and total debt ratios computed using the market value approach and the total debt ratio 
using the book value approach.
. 
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Regression results
In Table 6, panels A, B and C show the results from our regression analysis on the unmatched, PSM 
and entropy-balance matched sample respectively. First of all, regarding our control variables, we find 
the most consistent results for size and profitability. The coefficients of SIZE is significantly positive 
across all samples and for all leverage measures. This is consistent with the trade-off theory according 
to which bigger companies have lower default risk due to their better diversification and reputation so 
that they tend to have higher leverage. The coefficients of ROA are significantly negative at 1% for all 
our leverage measures and across all samples. This supports both the pecking order and the dynamic 
trade-off theory. The coefficients on the industry medians of the dependent variable show that there is 
positive industry dependence, however not for all samples and not for all measures of leverage. The 
coefficient for MTB is either negative or insignificant, yielding mild support for the pecking order 
theory. The coefficient of PPE yields inconsistent results across the different estimations. Surprisingly, 
if significant, then the coefficient of DEBTAX is negative, which is, inconsistent with the idea of the 
tax-shield effect from debt. Booth et al. (2001) offer an explanation that the tax rate in the emerging 
































































countries seems to be a proxy of profitability. More profitable companies have less demand for external 
financing (Donaldson, 1963; Higgins, 1977). If significant, the coefficient of NDEBTAX is positive 
which is consistent with the argument by Bradley et al. (1984) that companies that have high 
depreciation have high tangible assets that allow them to borrow at lower interest rates if the tangible 
assets are used to secure the debt.  
With regard to our variable of interest, BIG4, across all definitions of leverage and across all 
samples, we find a significant negative effect of being audited by a local auditor which is affiliated with 
a Big4 audit firm. This effect is also economically significant, i.e. the effect of BIG4 on the debt ratio 
ranges between -3.1 (Table 6B, second column) and -8.1 (Table 6A, first column) percentage points. 
This evidence is in line with our hypothesis that Big4 audit firms reduce perceived information 
asymmetry, even in a country like Indonesia, where risk of litigation is relatively low and where the 
involvement of the Big4 audit firm is only through affiliation. 
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Additional analyses
Affiliation with Big4 versus second-tier audit firms
We were also interested to find out whether affiliation of a local Indonesian audit firm with a 
second-tier audit firm also has a (similar) negative effect on leverage. The growth of second-tier firms 
and the emergence of ‘second-tier’ as a brand name suggests that second-tier audit firms also face 
reputation and litigation concerns, which would reduce the differences in their incentive system 
compared with that of the Big4 audit firms. In the US for instance, regulators have been promoting 
second-tier firms as a viable alternative to the Big4 firms, based on the belief that they provide similar 
audit quality. Boone et al. (2010), for a sample of U.S. listed companies, found small differences in 
actual audit quality between Big4 and second-tier clients. However, the differences in perceived audit 
quality, as measured by the ex-ante equity risk premia, were still pronounced in favour of Big4 clients. 
Cassell et al. (2013) found that for a sample of listed US firms that the financial reporting credibility of 
second-tier audit clients became indistinguishable from that of Big4 clients as the size of second-tier 
audit firms increased over time. Accordingly, we wanted to investigate for our sample of Indonesian 
firms whether affiliation with a second-tier auditor also had a negative effect on leverage. 
We follow Hogan and Martin (2009) in defining second-tier audit firms and identified Grant 
Thornton, Crowe and BDO Seidman as international second-tier firms that have affiliations with local 
Indonesian audit firms. We then employ two research designs to investigate this question.
First, we re-code our dummy variable so that it now indicates both affiliation with either Big4 
or second-tier audit firm. The base case then applies to a local auditor with affiliation to an international 
































































audit firm which is neither a Big4 nor second-tier audit firm or to a local auditor with no affiliation at 
all. The left side of Table 7 (A, B & C) shows the results of re-estimating our basic regression where 
Big4 is defined accordingly (for the unmatched, PSM and entropy-balance matched sample 
respectively). Although the coefficients of this more encompassing dummy are generally still negative 
and significant, the absolute value of these coefficients is generally smaller than when the Big4 dummy 
captured only audits by the Big4-affiliated audit firms in Table 6. So the effect that we find for affiliation 
is smaller when also affiliations with second-tier firms are considered.
In a second research design to address this question, we delete all firm-year observations with 
Big4 affiliations. In the ensuing sample, we define a new dummy 2NDTIER, which is coded one when 
the local auditor was affiliated with a second-tier audit firm and zero in all other cases. The results of 
estimating our basic regression on this reduced sample with the variable BIG4 replaced by the variable 
2NDTIER  are shown in the right side of Table 7. Across the three sampling methods (unmatched, PSM 
and entropy-balanced), we find that the effect of affiliation with second-tier auditors is generally not 
significant and when significant, the effect is negative as the effect of affiliation with Big4 auditors that 
we found in Table 6.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Interaction between company size and Big4
We were also interested to investigate whether the effect of BIG4 would differ 
according to the size of the client. Information asymmetry is expected to be higher in small 
companies (Bhushan, 1989; Collins, Kothari & Rayburn, 1987). These firms experience less 
extensive analyst following (Barth, Kasznik & McNichols, 2001) and media coverage (Fang 
& Peress, 2009). Based on the notion that, for larger companies, the issues of information 
asymmetry are less severe, we expect there to be less opportunity for Big4 auditors to further 
mitigate such information asymmetry. Hence, we expect the negative effect of Big4 on leverage 
to be less outspoken for larger companies. To empirically test this idea, we added an interaction 
effect to our basic regression. More in particular, our regression looks as follows: 
DRj,𝑡 + 1
=  β0 + β1 ∗ BIG4j,t +  β2 ∗ SIZEj,t +  β3 ∗ BIG4j,t ∗ SIZEj,t +  β4 ∗ ROAj,t +  β5 ∗ INDLEVj,t
+ β6 ∗ MTBj,t +  β7 ∗ RETj,t + β8 ∗ PPEj,t + β9 ∗ DEBTAXj,t +  β10 ∗ NDEBTAXj,t +  β
11 ∗ SDROAj,t +  εj,t
 
The estimation results for the three samples can be found in Table 8. The effect of BIG4 
































































on leverage can now no longer be judged on its own as it now depends on SIZE. For example, 
with the entropy-balance matched sample, the first derivative of leverage (LTDMEQ) with 
respect to BIG4 equals 0.734 – 0.036 * SIZE. Evaluated at the median SIZE (21.20), the 
derivative equals 0.734 – (0.036 * 21.20) = - 0.029, showing a negative effect of Big4 affiliation 
on leverage. Surprisingly however, the negative effect increases with SIZE, opposite to what 
we expected. And this surprising result holds over all leverage measures and across all three 
samples. One possible explanation is that the increased analyst activity and media attention 
which surrounds large companies also makes the perceived higher financial reporting quality 
from Big4 affiliation more salient in the financial markets.   
[Insert Table 8 about here]
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to investigate whether the appointment of a Big4 audit firm 
affects the capital structure of Indonesian listed companies. Indonesia is a fast-growing emerging 
country that is characterized by weak governance, high information asymmetry and low litigation. Prior 
research suggests that findings from developed countries, mainly the US, need not to hold in a different 
institutional setting (Booth et al. 2001). Moreover, results of prior research may not hold as in Indonesia 
foreign (Big4 or other) auditors are only allowed to operate indirectly through affiliation with a local 
auditor.
We find that listed Indonesian companies audited by local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 
audit firm tend to have a lower leverage ratio compared to those audited by non-Big4-affiliated local 
audit firms. This finding is consistent with the argument that the appointment of a higher quality (Big4) 
audit firm enhances the perceived credibility of the financial statements, hereby reducing perceived 
information asymmetry, and indicates that this argument even holds in a low litigation risk setting like 
Indonesia where Big4 can only enter the market through affiliation with a local audit firm. 
Our results are of interest to policy makers, managers and financial stakeholders in emerging 
countries where external financing is important (Atkins and Glen 1992) yet difficult to obtain because 
of severe information asymmetry. Our results suggest that the appointment of a local auditor that is 
affiliated with an international (especially Big 4) audit firm reduces the perceived information 
asymmetry hereby helping companies to optimize their capital structure and finance their growth. From 
a practical point of view, the results suggest that, in order to support the external financing and growth 
of firms, policy makers may want to ease the entrance of Big 4 auditors in the Indonesian market. From 
































































a management perspective, the results indicate that the appointment of a Big4-affiliated auditor provides 
benefits in term of enhanced access to equity financing to finance their growth.  
Notwithstanding that, due to the low litigation risk and the indirect foreign auditor access which 
characterize Indonesia, our research setting is demanding, and our findings are strong, the extent to 
which our conclusions transfer to other emerging countries is an open question which can only be 
answered by future studies in other geographic areas. Already a few related studies in other countries 
have been performed. For instance, Detthamrong, Chancharat & Vithessonthi (2017) find for small 
firms in Thailand, the appointment of a Big4 auditor is negatively associated with firm performance, a 
finding that - according to the authors – can be explained by the deterrence of earnings management as 
a consequence of the presence of Big 4 auditors. Another example of a related study is Wong, Firth, 
and Lo (2018), which focusses on a legal distinction which exists between audit firms in China which 
affects the legal liability of the audit firm. They find that auditor size is positively related to audit quality, 
but only when the auditors liability is capped. This positive association disappears for audit firms that 
are subject to high litigation risk exposures. We hope that future studies will shed further light on the 
effect of Big4 audit firms in emerging countries and the different institutional characteristics that 
moderate these effects. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
LTDMEQ : Debt ratio: long term debt /(market value of equity + book value of long term debt) 
LTDEQ : Debt ratio: (long term debt)/(book value of equity + book value of long term debt)
TDMEQ : Debt ratio: total debt/(market value of equity + book value of total debt)
TDEQ : Debt ratio: total debt/(book value of equity + book value of total debt)
BIG4 : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company was audited by a local audit firm 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm and 0 otherwise
SIZE : The natural log of total assets
ROA : Return on assets: net income before extra items scaled by total assets.
INDLTDMEQ : Industry median leverage: industry median ((long term debt + current portion of long 
term debt)/market value of equity)
INDLTDEQ : Industry median leverage: industry median ((long term debt + current portion of long 
term debt)/book value of equity)
INDTDMEQ : Industry median leverage: industry median (total debt/market value of equity)
INDTDEQ : Industry median leverage: industry median (total debt/book value of equity)
MTB : Growth and investment opportunities: market to book value of assets (total assets – 
book value of equity + market value of equity)/ total assets
RET : Holding period stock return over the fiscal year: (ending year stock price – beginning 
year stock price)/beginning year stock price 
PPE : Tangible assets: Property, plant and equipment/total assets
DEBTAX : Tax advantage debt: Current income tax/pre-tax income 
NDEBTAX : Non-debt tax shield: depreciation/total assets
SDROA : Standard deviation of return on assets from the previous three years
FOREIGN : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is from a foreign 
country and 0 otherwise
OWN : Percentage of closely held shares
CROSS : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company is cross-listed, and 0 otherwise
STATE : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a company is state-owned and 0 otherwise
ATURN :   Asset turnover/ total sales/total assets
CURR : Current assets/total assets
LEV : Leverage: long term debt/total assets
LOSS : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company experienced negative net income 
before extraordinary items in the prior year, and 0 otherwise
































































Table 2 : Sample selection method
 drop firm-years
Initial sample* 2,573
 Companies that had total assets growth >100% (64)
 Subsidiary companies (138)
 Companies with missing values variables (394)  
 Final sample  1,977
Table 3: Sample breakdown by year and industry
Sample initial sample*
Panel A: by year # % # %
% Final sample to initial 
sample
2008 191 9.66 274 10.65 69.71
2009 204 10.32 280 10.88 72.86
2010 204 10.32 297 11.54 68.69
2011 247 12.49 313 12.16 78.91
2012 251 12.70 329 12.79 76.29
2013 274 13.86 349 13.56 78.51
2014 297 15.02 361 14.03 82.27
2015 309 15.63 370 14.38 83.51
Total 1,977 100      2,573 100  
Sample  Initial sample*
Panel B: by industry
# % # %
% Final sample to initial 
sample
Basic  materials 450 22.76 562 21.84 80.07
Consumer goods 546 27.62 682 26.51 80.06
Consumer services 308 15.58 451 17.53 68.29
Health care 76 3.84   92 3.58 82.61
Industrials 424 21.45 547 21.26 77.51
Oil & gas 44 2.23   58 2.25 75.86
Technology 67 3.39 109 4.24 61.47
Telecommunication 49 2.48    57 2.22 85.96
Utilities 13 0.66    15 0.58 86.67
Total 1,977 100 2,573 100  
* Initial sample of all Indonesian listed non-financial companies over the 2008-2015 period
Industry groups are based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) universe retrieved from Worldscope/Datastream.
































































Table 4: Descriptive statistics
 Mean SD p10 Median p90 Min Max
LTDMEQ 0.2331 0.2625 0 0.1291 0.6735 0 0.8802
LTDEQ 0.2553 0.2773 0 0.1735 0.6266 -0.0285 1.1348
TDMEQ 0.3208 0.2791 0.0002 0.2644 0.7583 0 0.9054
TDEQ 0.3694 0.3194 0.0000 0.3431 0.7262 0 1.5628
BIG4 0.3859 0.4869 0 0 1 0 1
SIZE 21.2130 1.7439 18.9436 21.2045 23.5690 17.2326 24.7982
ROA 0.0365 0.1030 -0.0661 0.0319 0.1448 -0.2765 0.3428
INDLTDMEQ 0.1398 0.0835 0.0652 0.1298 0.2553 0.0009 0.4330
INDLTDEQ 0.1831 0.0936 0.1029 0.1671 0.2571 0.0034 0.5632
INDTDMEQ 0.2620 0.0967 0.1838 0.2531 0.3719 0.0148 0.4732
INDTDEQ 0.3433 0.0887 0.2719 0.3586 0.4268 0.0488 0.5640
MTB 1.7065 1.5634 0.7087 1.1468 3.2376 0.4722 9.1356
RET 0.1494 0.6589 -0.4772 0 0.9774 -0.7658 2.6297
PPE 0.3912 0.2398 0.0762 0.3675 0.7440 0.0139 0.9020
DEBTTAX 0.1787 0.2122 0 0.2100 0.4010 -0.3265 0.8772
NDEBTTAX 0.0392 0.0310 0.0082 0.0323 0.0810 0.0011 0.1478
SDROA 0.0486 0.0714 0.0053 0.0245 0.1119 0.0014 0.3774
FOREIGN 0.2969 0.4570 0 0 1 0 1
OWN 0.6866 0.1957 0.4320 0.7126 0.9217 0.1428 0.9800
CROSS 0.4107 0.4921 0 0 1 0 1
STATE 0.0607 0.2388 0 0 0 0 1
ATURN 1.0329 0.7568 0.2047 0.8967 2.0214 0.0404 3.4305
CURR 0.4937 0.2396 0.1572 0.4920 0.8206 0.0625 0.9366
LEV 0.1343 0.1674 0 0.0674 0.3752 0.0000 0.7048
LOSS 0.1887 0.3913 0 0 1 0 1
N              1,977             
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
































































Panel B:  By audit firm type
BIG4 NON-BIG4
 
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
t-test z-test
LTDMEQ        0.2065   0.2496         0.1068         0.2499         0.2690         0.1460 -3.66 *** -3.97 ***
LTDEQ        0.2584   0.2728         0.1904         0.2533         0.2802         0.1672 0.41 0.154
TDMEQ        0.2837   0.2711         0.2088         0.3441         0.2816         0.2905 -4.75 *** -4.73 ***
TDEQ        0.3530   0.2911         0.3314         0.3797         0.3357         0.3505 -1.87 1.01
SIZE       22.1474   1.4480       22.1378       20.6257         1.6562       20.6178 21.5 *** 19.2 ***
ROA        0.0689   0.1048         0.0530         0.0161         0.0965         0.0238 11.25 *** 10.17 ***
INDLTDMEQ        0.1432   0.0887         0.1298         0.1376         0.0800         0.1298 1.41 0.69
INDLTDEQ        0.1851   0.1032         0.1647         0.1818         0.0871         0.1671 -0.75 -1.21
INDTDMEQ        0.2630   0.0980         0.2531         0.2614         0.0959         0.2531 0.37 0.33
INDTDEQ        0.3431   0.0938         0.3522         0.3435         0.0854         0.3586 -0.08 -0.54
MTB        1.9929   1.7466         1.3657         1.5265         1.4075         1.0734 6.21 *** 8.56 ***
RET        0.1704   0.6834 0         0.1361         0.6429 0 1.11 0.79
PPE        0.4043   0.2129         0.3773         0.3829         0.2551         0.3547 2.01 ** 2.64 ***
DEBTTAX        0.2203   0.2089         0.2499         0.1526         0.2101         0.1111 6.99 ** 8.65 ***
NDEBTTAX        0.0428   0.0283         0.0374         0.0369         0.0324         0.0285 4.27 *** 7.45 ***
SDROA        0.0426   0.0542         0.0259         0.0524         0.0802         0.0232 -3.24 *** 1.71 *
FOREIGN        0.4168   0.4933 0         0.2216         0.4155 0 9.09 *** 9.24 ***
OWN        0.7139   0.1726         0.7278         0.6695         0.2071         0.7070 5.15 *** 3.94 ***
CROSS        0.5544   0.4974 1         0.3204         0.4668 0 10.42 *** 10.29 ***
STATE        0.0865   0.2813 0         0.0445         0.2062 0 3.56 *** 3.81 ***
ATURN        1.1403   0.7468         0.9596         0.9654         0.7555         0.8309 5.05 *** 5.92 ***
CURR        0.4886   0.2142         0.4821         0.4969         0.2543         0.5021 -0.78 -0.86
LEV        0.1346   0.1577         0.0795         0.1341         0.1733         0.0567 0.06 -0.07
LOSS        0.1350   0.3419 0         0.2224         0.4160 0 -5.08 *** -4.84 ***
N 763 1214
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
The student test (t-stat) is used to test the null hypotheses that the mean values are equal.
The Mann-Whitney test (z-stat) us used to test the null hypothesis that both distributions are homogeneous, i.e. drawn from the same 
population.
*,** and *** indicate a two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 threshold, respectively.































































Table 5: Pearson & Spearman correlation
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ BIG4 SIZE ROA INDLTDMEQ INDLTDEQ INDTDMEQ INDTDEQ MTB RET PPE DEBTTAX NDEBTTAX SDROA
LTDMEQ 1 0.845 0.808 0.695 -0.089 0.303 -0.385 0.165 0.147 0.141 0.136 -0.221 -0.171 0.361 -0.151 0.235 -0.045
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** **
LTDEQ 0.777 1 0.608 0.754 0.004 0.379 -0.260 0.140 0.175 0.110 0.144 -0.059 -0.081 0.345 -0.080 0.209 -0.084
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
TDMEQ 0.845 0.593 1 0.820 -0.106 0.170 -0.453 0.147 0.097 0.149 0.147 -0.378 -0.189 0.220 -0.148 0.103 -0.088
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
TDEQ 0.641 0.748 0.732 1 -0.023 0.259 -0.361 0.125 0.113 0.122 0.155 -0.079 -0.083 0.208 -0.117 0.113 -0.074
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
BIG4 -0.081 0.009 -0.105 -0.041 1 0.432 0.229 0.016 -0.027 0.007 -0.012 0.193 0.018 0.060 0.195 0.168 0.039
*** *** * *** *** *** *** *** *** *
SIZE 0.267 0.325 0.163 0.184 0.425 1 0.121 0.114 0.091 0.084 0.123 0.116 -0.041 0.160 0.112 0.084 -0.110
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** ***
ROA -0.354 -0.272 -0.392 -0.364 0.250 0.152 1 -0.192 -0.092 -0.177 -0.084 0.335 0.322 -0.197 0.420 -0.089 -0.100
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
INDLTDMEQ 0.180 0.164 0.151 0.126 0.033 0.177 -0.152 1 0.630 0.909 0.611 -0.171 -0.208 0.117 -0.067 0.138 0.037
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
INDLTDEQ 0.162 0.208 0.105 0.120 0.018 0.201 -0.106 0.742 1 0.484 0.517 -0.017 -0.029 0.128 0.004 0.175 -0.065
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
INDTDMEQ 0.166 0.133 0.169 0.137 0.008 0.112 -0.146 0.863 0.585 1 0.678 -0.202 -0.222 0.110 -0.064 0.103 0.037
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *
INDTDEQ 0.172 0.178 0.167 0.164 -0.002 0.167 -0.111 0.689 0.703 0.768 1 -0.098 -0.071 0.140 0.007 0.063 -0.018
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
MTB -0.237 -0.126 -0.333 -0.106 0.145 -0.038 0.301 -0.157 -0.079 -0.179 -0.116 1 0.317 -0.026 0.060 0.088 0.135
*** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
RET -0.175 -0.080 -0.184 -0.081 0.025 -0.022 0.230 -0.149 -0.032 -0.160 -0.057 0.220 1 -0.079 0.135 -0.029 -0.067
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** ***
PPE 0.324 0.300 0.200 0.168 0.043 0.139 -0.179 0.140 0.188 0.139 0.197 0.009 -0.077 1 -0.172 0.551 0.044
*** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** **
DEBTTAX -0.158 -0.107 -0.127 -0.123 0.155 0.098 0.278 -0.026 -0.012 -0.020 -0.023 -0.011 0.093 -0.144 1 -0.052 -0.277
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** ***
NDEBTTAX 0.204 0.205 0.109 0.169 0.093 0.015 -0.182 0.177 0.267 0.105 0.123 0.118 -0.032 0.456 -0.076 1 0.093
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
SDROA 0.017 -0.008 -0.028 0.064 -0.067 -0.191 -0.169 0.002 -0.025 0.004 0.004 0.185 -0.043 0.032 -0.239 0.149 1
*** *** *** *** *** * *** ***
Pearson and Spearman correlations are reported below above the diagonal respectively. 
N = 1,977. For variable definitions: see Table 1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
































































Table 6A: Two-way clustered SE OLS estimation on Big4
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -0.870 -1.060 -0.422 -0.740
(5.83)*** (6.61)*** (2.53)** (4.00)***
BIG4 (-) -0.081 -0.054 -0.056 -0.046
(3.71)*** (2.13)** (2.04)** (1.51)
SIZE (+) 0.052 0.060 0.036 0.050
(6.96)*** (7.23)*** (4.48)*** (5.30)***
ROA (-) -0.633 -0.655 -0.794 -1.129









MTB (±) -0.022 -0.006 -0.036 0.004
(3.70)*** (0.91) (5.33)*** (0.35)
RET (-) -0.026 0.004 -0.030 -0.001
(3.03)*** (0.62) (3.92)*** (0.13)
PPE (+) 0.202 0.185 0.101 0.020
(4.57)*** (4.08)*** (1.99)** (0.34)
DEBTAX (+) -0.086 -0.063 -0.067 -0.065
(2.93)*** (1.88)* (1.50) (1.49)
NDEBTAX (±) 0.718 0.679 0.337 0.807
(1.46) (1.35) (0.67) (1.36)
SDROA (-) 0.071 -0.015 -0.097 0.092
(0.56) (0.11) (0.63) (0.36)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.33 0.27 0.29 0.22
N 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
































































Table 6B: Propensity Score Matching on Big4
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -1.013 -1.169 -0.113 -0.516
(11.26)*** (11.24)*** (1.02) (3.96)***
BIG4 (-) -0.048 -0.031 -0.054 -0.038
(3.42)*** (1.93)* (3.46)*** (2.00)**
SIZE (+) 0.059 0.064 0.027 0.041
(13.76)*** (12.87)*** (5.47)*** (6.56)***
ROA (-) -0.845 -0.888 -1.074 -1.419









MTB (±) -0.023 0.006 -0.048 0.011
(4.28)*** (0.81) (8.09)*** (1.08)
RET (-) -0.019 -0.001 -0.011 0.004
(1.90)* (0.13) (0.90) (0.25)
PPE (+) 0.236 0.183 0.076 -0.090
(6.53)*** (4.70)*** (2.01)** (1.98)**
DEBTAX (+) -0.085 -0.096 -0.085 -0.090
(2.33)** (2.58)** (2.33)** (2.43)**
NDEBTAX (±) 0.034 0.297 -0.074 0.720
(0.13) (0.82) (0.26) (1.90)*
SDROA (-) 0.399 0.313 0.199 0.647
(2.81)*** (1.57) (1.02) (2.36)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.40 0.32 0.37 0.28
N 1,072 1,071 1,079 1,053
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
































































Table 6C: Entropy Balance on Big4
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -1.037 -1.434 -0.410 -0.906
(6.58)*** (6.64)*** (2.51)** (4.38)***
BIG4 (-) -0.065 -0.051 -0.049 -0.063
(3.06)*** (1.96)** (2.34)** (2.51)**
SIZE (+) 0.060 0.080 0.033 0.059
(7.45)*** (7.13)*** (4.14)*** (5.50)***
ROA (-) -0.910 -1.177 -1.135 -1.642









MTB (±) -0.018 0.002 -0.033 0.003
(3.09)*** (0.27) (5.21)*** (0.29)
RET (-) 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.000
(0.09) (0.63) (0.20) (0.02)
PPE (+) 0.090 0.111 -0.034 -0.179
(1.70)* (1.54) (0.58) (2.22)**
DEBTAX (+) -0.105 -0.090 -0.110 -0.175
(1.73)* (1.15) (1.99)** (2.32)**
NDEBTAX (±) 0.967 0.476 0.617 1.479
(2.19)** (0.71) (1.36) (2.35)**
SDROA (-) 0.365 0.653 0.303 0.710
(1.73)* (2.69)*** (1.29) (2.40)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43
N 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively































































Table 7A: Two-way clustered OLS on Big4 and second-tier as one category
BIG4&2NDTIER 2NDTIER ONLY
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -0.799 -1.008 -0.357 -0.698 -1.040 -1.137 -0.807 -1.055
(5.59)*** (6.78)*** (2.30)** (4.13)*** (6.10)*** (6.11)*** (4.65)*** (4.76)***
BIG4&2NDTIER (-) -0.061 -0.038 -0.034 -0.033
(3.28)*** (1.78)* (1.49) (1.32)
2NDTIER (-) 0.004 0.004 0.026 0.003
(0.16) (0.13) (0.86) (0.11)
SIZE (+) 0.049 0.058 0.033 0.049 0.058 0.064 0.050 0.064
(6.84)*** (7.51)*** (4.37)*** (5.55)*** (6.59)*** (6.43)*** (6.14)*** (5.96)***
ROA (-) -0.651 -0.668 -0.812 -1.139 -0.500 -0.456 -0.620 -0.937
(6.63)*** (5.36)*** (6.74)*** (6.42)*** (4.11)*** (2.74)*** (3.99)*** (4.58)***
INDLTMDEQ (+) 0.058 0.213
(0.49) (1.59)
INDLTDEQ (+) 0.170 0.175
(1.43) (1.31)
INDTDMEQ (+) 0.195 0.302
(1.71)* (1.81)*
INDTDEQ (+) 0.238 0.273
(1.89)* (1.44)
MTB (±) -0.023 -0.007 -0.037 0.003 -0.021 -0.006 -0.034 0.005
(3.97)*** (1.08) (5.58)*** (0.27) (2.38)** (0.57) (3.67)*** (0.33)
RET (-) -0.025 0.004 -0.029 -0.001 -0.028 -0.000 -0.036 -0.011
(3.15)*** (0.70) (4.00)*** (0.10) (2.17)** (0.02) (2.95)*** (0.74)
PPE (+) 0.204 0.187 0.103 0.021 0.193 0.171 0.116 0.026
(4.60)*** (4.10)*** (2.03)** (0.36) (3.72)*** (3.21)*** (1.94)* (0.38)
DEBTAX (+) -0.090 -0.066 -0.071 -0.067 -0.083 -0.053 -0.020 -0.028
(3.05)*** (1.95)* (1.57) (1.53) (2.26)** (1.30) (0.36) (0.46)
NDEBTAX (±) 0.648 0.622 0.276 0.762 1.263 0.970 1.191 1.404
(1.32) (1.25) (0.55) (1.30) (2.02)** (1.48) (1.80)* (1.71)*
SDROA (-) 0.062 -0.021 -0.103 0.088 0.040 -0.186 -0.073 0.011
(0.49) (0.15) (0.67) (0.34) (0.27) (1.44) (0.43) (0.04)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes































































R2 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.22
N 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively































































Tabel 7B PSM analysis on Big4 and second-tier as one category
BIG4&2NDTIER 2NDTIER ONLY
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -0.806 -1.165 -0.115 -0.629 -1.158 -1.278 -1.121 -1.301
(9.86)*** (13.47)*** (1.24) (5.97)*** (4.67)*** (5.51)*** (5.31)*** (5.82)***
BIG4&2NDTIER (-) -0.036 -0.038 -0.049 -0.052
(2.80)*** (2.71)*** (3.34)*** (3.10)***
2NDTIER (-) -0.066 -0.046 0.014 -0.038
(2.07)** (1.69)* (0.48) (1.34)
SIZE (+) 0.049 0.066 0.025 0.047 0.062 0.075 0.062 0.081
(12.41)*** (15.56)*** (5.86)*** (9.39)*** (5.18)*** (6.39)*** (6.06)*** (6.75)***
ROA (-) -0.764 -0.942 -1.089 -1.411 -0.610 -0.881 -0.913 -1.306
(9.13)*** (8.16)*** (11.71)*** (10.27)*** (3.02)*** (3.81)*** (4.59)*** (4.83)***
INDLTMDEQ (+) 0.027 0.616
(0.31) (2.98)***
INDLTDEQ (+) 0.109 0.088
(1.52) (0.63)
INDTDMEQ (+) 0.200 0.538
(2.68)*** (2.98)***
INDTDEQ (+) 0.247 0.283
(3.11)*** (1.55)
MTB (±) -0.030 0.005 -0.044 0.003 -0.043 0.001 -0.069 -0.036
(5.95)*** (0.85) (7.71)*** (0.34) (2.17)** (0.06) (2.74)*** (1.41)
RET (-) -0.022 0.014 -0.020 0.007 -0.014 0.029 -0.014 0.035
(2.39)** (1.28) (1.80)* (0.50) (0.62) (1.23) (0.66) (1.22)
PPE (+) 0.197 0.176 0.056 -0.051 0.223 0.132 0.091 -0.046
(6.19)*** (4.94)*** (1.60) (1.23) (3.41)*** (1.99)** (1.43) (0.70)
DEBTAX (+) -0.105 -0.103 -0.075 -0.099 -0.129 -0.294 0.001 -0.142
(2.93)*** (2.93)*** (2.19)** (2.73)*** (1.52) (3.96)*** (0.01) (1.94)*
NDEBTAX (±) 0.784 0.586 0.125 1.181 2.235 1.664 2.390 2.800
(2.64)*** (1.65)* (0.42) (3.13)*** (2.37)** (1.60) (3.18)*** (3.18)***
SDROA (-) 0.191 0.202 0.091 0.247 -0.036 -0.643 -0.302 -0.350
(1.43) (1.29) (0.58) (1.16) (0.14) (2.02)** (1.14) (1.02)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes































































R2 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.37
N 1,319 1,337 1,315 1,330 266 286 280 284
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively































































Table 7C Entropy balancing Big4 and second-tier as one category
BIG4&2NDTIER 2NDTIER ONLY
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -1.046 -1.367 -0.367 -0.816 -1.474 -1.578 -1.013 -1.051
(8.22)*** (7.92)*** (2.80)*** (5.09)*** (8.99)*** (8.07)*** (5.94)*** (5.31)***
BIG4&2NDTIER (-) -0.052 -0.039 -0.044 -0.055
(3.30)*** (2.07)** (2.69)*** (2.92)***
2NDTIER (-) -0.031 -0.017 -0.014 -0.034
(1.63) (0.91) (0.66) (1.57)
SIZE (+) 0.061 0.078 0.036 0.060 0.076 0.085 0.059 0.066
(9.54)*** (8.75)*** (5.86)*** (7.15)*** (9.21)*** (8.30)*** (7.25)*** (6.25)***
ROA (-) -0.837 -0.948 -1.152 -1.487 -0.698 -0.820 -0.944 -1.526
(9.21)*** (7.00)*** (12.89)*** (10.50)*** (4.79)*** (3.79)*** (5.71)*** (5.95)***
INDLTMDEQ (+) 0.124 0.507
(1.22) (4.31)***
INDLTDEQ (+) 0.057 0.180
(0.53) (1.61)
INDTDMEQ (+) 0.187 0.527
(2.00)** (4.02)***
INDTDEQ (+) 0.149 0.355
(1.51) (2.73)***
MTB (±) -0.023 -0.005 -0.036 -0.001 -0.053 -0.020 -0.075 -0.005
(4.31)*** (0.84) (6.22)*** (0.21) (4.20)*** (1.30) (4.38)*** (0.27)
RET (-) -0.006 0.008 -0.012 0.002 -0.005 0.013 -0.004 0.024
(0.43) (0.57) (0.80) (0.11) (0.36) (0.75) (0.24) (1.12)
PPE (+) 0.164 0.137 0.033 -0.086 0.226 0.160 0.102 -0.029
(4.41)*** (2.79)*** (0.78) (1.51) (4.82)*** (2.99)*** (2.07)** (0.54)
DEBTAX (+) -0.118 -0.118 -0.097 -0.127 -0.090 -0.206 0.047 -0.097
(2.07)** (1.62) (1.92)* (1.85)* (1.45) (3.54)*** (0.75) (1.56)
NDEBTAX (±) 0.596 0.277 0.174 0.688 2.490 2.282 2.143 2.284
(1.73)* (0.58) (0.51) (1.31) (3.55)*** (2.92)*** (3.43)*** (2.89)***
SDROA (-) 0.444 0.530 0.350 0.707 -0.007 -0.487 -0.444 -0.634































































(2.78)*** (2.90)*** (1.86)* (3.26)*** (0.03) (1.76)* (1.78)* (2.23)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.35
N 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
































































Table 8A: Two-way clustered OLS with interaction effect on Big4
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -1.037 -1.192 -0.756 -1.114
(6.34)*** (6.16)*** (4.52)*** (4.91)***
BIG4 (-) 0.327 0.327 0.827 0.799
(1.31) (1.34) (2.52)** (2.48)**
SIZE (+) 0.061 0.068 0.052 0.066
(7.41)*** (6.89)*** (6.42)*** (6.04)***
SIZE*BIG4 (?) -0.019 -0.018 -0.041 -0.039
(1.64) (1.55) (2.76)*** (2.67)***
ROA (-) -0.624 -0.655 -0.789 -1.131









MTB (±) -0.020 -0.005 -0.034 0.005
(3.36)*** (0.67) (4.88)*** (0.50)
RET (-) -0.028 0.001 -0.032 -0.004
(3.38)*** (0.19) (3.98)*** (0.43)
PPE (+) 0.199 0.184 0.094 0.010
(4.57)*** (4.10)*** (1.89)* (0.17)
DEBTAX (+) -0.092 -0.062 -0.067 -0.058
(3.04)*** (1.82)* (1.44) (1.31)
NDEBTAX (±) 0.895 0.684 0.715 1.096
(1.75)* (1.32) (1.33) (1.66)*
SDROA (-) 0.040 -0.024 -0.121 0.078
(0.31) (0.17) (0.81) (0.31)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.34 0.28 0.31 0.23
N 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
































































Table 8B Propensity score matching with interaction effect on Big4
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -1.668 -1.593 -0.793 -0.954
(10.82)*** (8.35)*** (4.59)*** (3.69)***
BIG4 (-) 0.950 0.620 0.968 0.607
(5.09)*** (2.85)*** (4.62)*** (1.95)*
SIZE (+) 0.088 0.083 0.057 0.061
(12.43)*** (9.52)*** (7.63)*** (5.05)***
SIZE*BIG4 (?) -0.046 -0.030 -0.047 -0.030
(5.33)*** (2.99)*** (4.92)*** (2.11)**
ROA (-) -0.831 -0.880 -1.052 -1.401









MTB (±) -0.021 0.007 -0.047 0.013
(4.08)*** (0.98) (7.98)*** (1.27)
RET (-) -0.023 -0.002 -0.014 0.002
(2.32)** (0.18) (1.17) (0.11)
PPE (+) 0.239 0.184 0.075 -0.088
(6.65)*** (4.75)*** (2.00)** (1.97)**
DEBTAX (+) -0.083 -0.095 -0.077 -0.089
(2.32)** (2.57)** (2.12)** (2.42)**
NDEBTAX (±) 0.131 0.353 0.003 0.747
(0.49) (0.97) (0.01) (1.98)**
SDROA (-) 0.381 0.298 0.166 0.630
(2.65)*** (1.49) (0.85) (2.27)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.41 0.32 0.38 0.29
N 1,072 1,071 1,079 1,053
For variable definitions: see Table 1.
 *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
































































Table 8C Entropy balancing with interaction effect on Big4
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ
CONSTANT -1.482 -1.957 -0.986 -1.660
(4.87)*** (4.77)*** (3.52)*** (4.29)***
BIG4 (-) 0.734 0.892 0.978 1.276
(2.31)** (2.20)** (3.27)*** (3.11)***
SIZE (+) 0.079 0.103 0.058 0.092
(5.53)*** (5.31)*** (4.45)*** (5.04)***
SIZE*BIG4 (?) -0.036 -0.043 -0.046 -0.060
(2.47)** (2.28)** (3.40)*** (3.21)***
ROA (-) -0.862 -1.117 -1.069 -1.561









MTB (±) -0.016 0.005 -0.030 0.007
(2.59)*** (0.62) (4.57)*** (0.75)
RET (-) 0.002 0.012 0.005 0.001
(0.12) (0.68) (0.29) (0.06)
PPE (+) 0.094 0.113 -0.028 -0.178
(1.76)* (1.60) (0.48) (2.30)**
DEBTAX (+) -0.099 -0.081 -0.106 -0.163
(1.75)* (1.12) (2.13)** (2.37)**
NDEBTAX (±) 1.132 0.692 0.850 1.825
(2.58)*** (1.03) (1.91)* (2.86)***
SDROA (-) 0.336 0.624 0.263 0.657
(1.61) (2.60)*** (1.15) (2.25)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.45
N 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977
For variable definitions: see Table 1.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
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